Next-generation communication networks are positively looking towards the energy-efficient transfer of information and energy over the same wireless channel. Thus, users would be able to receive information and harvest energy. However, under the requirement of smaller base station (BS)-to-users (UEs) distances and higher received power levels, the physical layer will become more vulnerable to cyber attacks by potential multi-antenna eavesdroppers. To realize secure wireless information and power transfer, we consider transmit time-switching (TS) mode, where energy and information signal are transmitted separately in time by the BS. Such protocol is not only quite easier to implement than the receive power splitting (PS) approach but also delivers the opportunity of multi-purpose beamforming, where energy beamformers during wireless power transfer are useful in jamming the eavesdropper. In the presence of imperfect channel estimation and multi-antenna eavesdroppers, the energy and information beamformers and the transmit TS ratio are jointly optimized to maximize the worst-case user secrecy rate subject to UEs' harvested energy thresholds and BS transmit power budget. This secrecy rate optimization problem is very complicated due many computationally challenging constraints. A new robust path-following algorithm for its computational solution is proposed, which involves one simple convex quadratic program (QP) at each iteration. Robust secrecy energy efficiency maximization, which is further complex due to additional function of optimization variables in the denominator of secrecy rate function is also addressed. Numerical results confirm that performance of the proposed computational solutions is robust against the channel uncertainties.
secure data transmissions in such networks [10] [11] [12] . Many recent works considered looking into the beamforming design problem to maximize secrecy rate under the BS transmit power budget [13] [14] [15] [16] .
Beamforming requires the knowledge of downlink channels to the UEs, which can be obtained via channel estimation. Due to channel estimation errors in practical systems, the BS cannot expect perfect channel knowledge, which demands for robust beamforming design in the presence of channel uncertainties [13] , [15] . Adding wireless energy harvesting (EH) feature due to its viability in dense small-cell deployment introduces another EH constraint in secrecy rate optimization problem [17] . As mentioned above, physical layer security becomes more relevant in wireless information and power transfer systems.
Robust beamforming design in the presence of channel uncertainties with the same objective of secrecy rate maximization under receiver EH thresholds in addition to BS transmit power budget was recently considered in [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . Some of these works assume either only EH feature or only ID capability at the UEs [21] , [22] , so there were no PS or TS based simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) receivers. Assuming PS-based SWIPT receivers, secrecy rate maximization was studied in [18] [19] [20] , [23] . At griding points of normal rates, these works employ semi-definite programming and alternating optimization, where rank-one constraints have to be dropped and computationally complex matrices have to be optimized. Randomization has to be employed to achieve feasible beamforming vectors [23] . As already pointed out by [24] while ago, such randomization approach is not quite efficient.
Moreover, with the existing PS approach, it is well known that it is not practically easy to implement variable range power splitter and also, one can not jam the eavesdropper without transmitting artificial noise [7] . In contrast, as shown in the present paper, our recently proposed transmit TS approach [7] does not require to transmit extra artificial noise thanks to the fact that power-bearing signal sent during EH time can be simultaneously used to jam the eavesdropper.
Meanwhile, energy efficiency (EE) in terms of bits per Joule per Hertz is also a very important figure-
of-merit in assessing the practicability of next communication networks and beyond (see e.g. [25] [26] [27] ), where the Dinkelbach-type algorithm [28] of fractional programming is the main tool for obtaining computational solutions (see e.g. [29] , [30] and references therein). In the presence of eavesdroppers, secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) maximization has been studied recently in [31] , [32] . However, the approach to treat SEE in [31] , [32] is based on costly beamformers, which completely cancel the multiuser interference and wiretapped signal at the eavesdroppers. Moving step ahead, energy harvesting brings in conflicting requirements form the viewpoint of EE, as it requires a stronger transmit power. The problem of energy efficiency maximization in SWIPT systems has been recently studied in [33] [34] [35] . However, either the authors don't consider simultaneous EH and ID capability [35] or assume PS based receiver [33] , [34] . To the best of our knowledge, computational solution for robust beamforming design to achieve secrecy rate and SEE optimization, particularly assuming practical TS-based wireless EH systems, is still an open problem. The SEE objective is not a ratio of concave and convex functions, for which the Dinkelbach's algorithm based approach is very inefficient.
The subject of this paper is a multicell network, where the UEs in each cell are divided into two groups depending upon their distance from the serving BS. The one closer to the BS take the advantage of higher received power to perform wireless EH in addition to ID while the far-away users only conduct ID. We consider imperfect channel state information (CSI) case where the BSs have imperfect channel knowledge about UEs and eavesdroppers. We implement transmit TS approach [7] where BS transmits information and energy separately in different time portions and the energy beamformers can be exploited to jam the eavesdroppers. 1 In the presence of channel uncertainties, we formulate the worst-case based robust secrecy rate optimization problem. We solve for joint optimization of information and energy beamforming vectors with the transmit TS ratio, that could maximize the minimum secrecy rate among all users, while ensuring EH constraints for near-by users and transmit power constraints at the BSs. The problem is very difficult computationally due many challenging constraints, for which a path-following algorithm is developed for its computational solution. The algorithm does not require rank-constrained optimization and converges 1 Though we propose transmit TS approach to solve max-min rate and power minimization problems in [7] , however, the extension of those developed algorithms to solve robust secrecy rate and energy efficiency maximization problem in the presence of eavesdroppers and channel estimation errors (as will be detailed shortly in this paper) is highly non-trivial.
quite quickly in few iterations. Through extensive simulation, the achieved secrecy rate is shown to be close to the normal rate that excludes the presence of eavesdroppers. Furthermore, our numerical results confirm that performance of the proposed algorithm is close to that of the perfect channel knowledge case. In addition, the proposed algorithm not only outperforms the existing algorithm that models powersplitting (PS) based receiver but also the proposed transmit TS based model is implementation-wise quite simple than the PS-based model. In the end, we extend our development to solve and analyze robust SEE maximization problem, which is further complex due to additional function of optimization variables in the denominator of secrecy rate function.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the problem formulation for maximizing the worstcase user secrecy rate and its challenges, whereas Section III develops its computational solution. Section IV proposes a computational solution for the EE maximization. Section V evaluates the performance of our proposed algorithms by numerical examples. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation. We use {·} operator to denote the real part of its argument, ∇ operator to denote the firstorder differential operator, and x and X F to denote the Euclidean and Frobenius norm of a vector
x and matrix X, respectively. Also, we define x, y x H y.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a multicell network consisting of K small cells labeled by k ∈ K {1, . . . , K}. In each cell k, a multi-antenna BS k with M antennas communicates with N k single-antenna users (UEs) (k, n), n ∈ N k {1, . . . , N k } over the same bandwidth. We divide the users in each cell k into two zones, such that there are N 1,k users located nearby serving BS k in zone-1 and N 2,k users are located far from the BS k in zone-2, where N k = N 1,k +N 2,k . By UE (k, n 1 ) and UE (k, n 2 ), we mean UE n 1 ∈ N 1,k {1, . . . , N 1,k } in zone-1 and UE n 2 ∈ N 2,k {N 1,k + 1, . . . , N k } in zone-2 of cell k, respectively.
where its first term represents the desired signal, while the second and third terms are the intracell interference and intercell interference. The BSs are assumed to perform channel estimation to acquire channel knowledge hk ,k,n and the channel state information (CSI) errors are bounded by the uncertainty k ,k,n as follows [36] , [37] :
where ρ(A) is called the spectral radius of matrix A: ρ(A) = max i |λ i (A)| with its eigenvalues λ i (A), and the channel uncertainties k ,k,n are given by
where 0 and 1 are the normalized uncertainty levels related to neighboring cells' UEs and the serving cells' UEs, respectively. 2 Note that (5) covers all uncertainty structures [37] . Thus, incorporating the channel uncertainties, the worst-case information rate decoded by UE (k, n) is given by [37] (
where
Let us consider that for UEs (k, n) there is single eavesdropper k with N ev antennas in the zone-1, which eavesdrop the intended signals for the UE (k, n). The signal leaked at the EV k, denoted by y k ∈ C Nev×1 , is given by
where Hk ,k is the wiretap channel matrix of size M × N ev between BSk and UE k and z a k ∈ C N ev is the noise [9] , [38] [39] [40] . We assume that the wiretap channel state information Hk ,k is available through channel estimation subject to some uncertainty [36] , [37] 2 We have introduced two different uncertainty levels because later we will show in Section V that secrecy rate is more sensitive to the estimation errors of serving users' channels compared to that of the neighboring users' channels. 8 where k ,k = 0 Hk ,k 2 F and 0 is the normalized uncertainty level for the channels between BSs and the eavesdroppers. Therefore, the worst received SINR at the EV k, corresponding to the signal targeted for the UE (k, n), is given by [37] SINR
The main attractive feature in (11)- (12) is that the EH signals contribute very much to the denominator of the SINR (11) at EV k, i.e. they are also used in jamming the EV k. The secrecy rate expression for UE (k, n) in nat/sec/Hz is given as [41] 
The corresponding rate can be calculated in bits/sec/Hz units by evaluating
At first, we aim to jointly optimize the transmit information and energy beamforming vectors, x E k,n 1 and x I k,n , respectively, and the TS ratio η to maximize the minimum (user with worst channel conditions) secrecy rate
Constraint (14b) is the individual cell transmit power budget, P max k , at each BS k while constraint (14c) is the total transmit power budget, P max , of the network. Constraint (14d) requires that UE (k, n 1 )
harvests energy is greater than some preset target threshold e min k,n 1
. Note that the objective (14a) is highly non-concave while constraints (14b)-(14d) are non-convex due to coupling between beamforming vectors
x and time splitting factor η.
III. PROPOSED PATH-FOLLOWING COMPUTATION
In order to solve non-convex problem (14), we make the variable change:
which implies the following linear constraint
In what follows, we first transform the original max-min secrecy rate problem (14) by using a new variable µ. (14) by using a new variable µ: Using (15), the power constraints (14b) and (14c) become the following constraints:
Transformation of Problem
and applying (15) in (14d), the EH constraint (14d) in variable µ will become:
Under the variable change (13), the achievable secrecy rate in new variable µ is given bȳ
and by using q k,n (x, η) in (12),q k,n (x, µ) is defined as follows:
Using (17), (18), and (26), the equivalence of problem (14) in variables x and µ is given by
s.t. (17), (18), (16) .
Inner Approximation of Power constraint (17) and EH constraint (18): 3 Let (x ( ) , µ ( ) ) be a feasible point for (22) . By exploiting the convexity of function 1 µ x 2 , the following inequality holds true
Thus using (23), an inner convex approximation of non-convex constraints (17a) and (17b) is given bȳ
Next, following the definition of p k,n 1 (x E ) in (3), and using the approximation
an inner approximation of nonconvex constraint (18) is given by
Using the convex approximations (24) and (26) for the constraints of problem (22), we obtain its following inner approximation at th iteration:
As observed in [43] , forx
and |h
The problem (27) is thus equivalent 3 a constraint is called an inner approximation of another constraint if and only if any feasible point of the former is also feasible for the latter [42] to the following optimization problem:
(24a), (24b), (26), (16) .
Lower Approximation of the Objective (28a): For concave lower approximation off k,n (x, µ), which agrees withf k,n at w ( ) , µ ( ) , we provide a lower bounding concave function for the first termf
and an upper bounding convex function for the second termf
, we have the following result.
Theorem 1: A lower bounding concave functionf
and The upper bounding convex functionf
with
and
where constraint (36) is innerly approximated by the constraint:
for Solve convex problem (42) to find x E,( +1) , x I,( +1) , µ ( +1) .
5:
Set := + 1.
6: until the objective in (22) converges.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Thus, by applying Theorem 1, we can use the following convex quadratic program (QP) to achieve minorant maximization for the nonconvex problem (28) at feasible (x
s.t. (24a), (24b), (26) , (16), (28b), (31) , (35), (37), (38) .
Details of Proposed Algorithm 1 with its Initialization: The proposed computation for the max-min secrecy rate problem (22) (and hence (14)) is summarized in Algorithm 1. Since the objective function in (42) 
i.e. (x ( +1) , µ ( +1) ) is a feasible point, which is better than (x ( ) , µ ( ) ) for (22), whenever (
is the optimal solution of the convex optimization problem (42) then it must satisfy the KKT condition for (42) , which obviously is also KKT condition for (22) . We thus proved that the sequence {(x ( ) , µ ( ) )} converges to a KKT point for the nonconvex optimization problem (22) . (22) (and hence (14)) for initializing Algorithm 1 is found as as follows. We first fix µ (0) and solve the following convex problem:
where, for quick convergence, the constraint (44c) on the information rate of UE (k, n) is imposed. The constraint (44c) is a second-order cone constraint [44] . Using the optimal solution x E,(0) k,n of (44) as the initial point, we then iteratively solve the following convex program:
until a positive value of the objective function is achieved. If either problem (44) is found infeasible or an positive value by solving (45) is not found, we use different value of µ (0) and repeat the above process until a feasible point x E,(0) , x I,(0) , µ (0) is obtained. 4 
IV. ENERGY EFFICIENT SECURE BEAMFORMING
This section extends the proposed robust secrecy rate maximization algorithm to solve the secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) maximization problem, which is formulated in the presence of channel estimation errors and eavesdroppers as
where ξ is the constant power amplifier efficiency, P A is the power dissipation at each transmit antenna, P c is the fixed circuit power consumption for base-band processing and r k,n is the threshold secrecy rate to ensure quality of service. The security and energy efficiency are combined into a single objective in (46a) to express the so-called secrecy EE (SEE) in terms of secrecy bits per Joule per Hertz.
The conventional approach to address (46) (see e.g. [29] , [30] ) is based on the Dinkelbach's method of fractional programming [28] to find τ > 0 such that the optimal value of the following optimization problem is zero
However, for each fixed τ > 0, the optimization problem (47) is highly nonconvex convex and thus is still difficult computationally. It is important to realize that the original Dinkelbach's method [28] is attractive only for maximizing a ratio of a convex and concave functions over a convex set, under which each subproblem for fixed τ is an easy convex optimization problem. It is hardly useful whenever either the objective is not ratio of a concave and convex function or the constrained set is not convex.
We now develop an efficient path-following computational procedure for solution of (46), which bypasses such difficult optimization problem (47). Using the variable change (16) again, this problem is equivalent to
By using (30) we obtain
for (31), where t
Similarly to (34), we havē
with (35), (36) and
For the approximation (51) under (52), we have used the following inequality
The inner approximations in (49) and (51) can be easily followed by using the procedure in Appendix A.
The following convex program is minorant maximization for the nonconvex program (48) (26), (16), (28b), (31), (35), (52), (37), (38) 
Algorithm 2 outlines the steps to solve max-min energy efficiency problem (48) (and hence (46)). Similar to Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 generates a sequence
of improved points of (54), which converges to a KKT point, where t (27) (and hence (46)) for initializing Algorithm 2 can be obtained by first solving (44) and (45) followed Solve convex program (54) for x E,( +1) , x I,( +1) , t ( +1) µ ( +1) .
5:
6: until the objective in (48) converges. by a feasibility problem (54b), (54c), and (54d). It was already reported in Section III that how efficiently the solution of (44) and (45) is obtained. The solution to the feasibility problem (54b), (54c), and (54d) is mostly obtained at the first iteration.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To analyze the proposed algorithms through simulations, a network topology as shown in Fig. 1 is set up. There are K = 3 cells and N = N k = 4, ∀ k ∈ K UEs per cell with two placed inside the inner-circle in zone-1 and the remaining two placed in the outer zone near cell-edges, i.e.,
The cell radius is set to be 40m with inner circle radius of 15m. A single N ev = 2-antennas eavesdropper is randomly placed inside the inner circle in each cell. The path loss exponent is set to be µ = 3. We generate Rician fading channels with Rician factor, K R = 10 dB [3] . For simplicity, set e min k,n 1 ≡ e min for the energy harvesting thresholds and ζ k,n 1 ≡ ζ, ∀k, n 1 for the energy harvesting conversion. Further, we set energy conversion efficiency ζ = 0.5, noise variance σ 2 a = −90 dBm, maximum BS transmit power P max k = 26 dBm, ∀ k, which is in line with the frequently made assumption for the power budget of small-cell BSs [45] . We choose the value P max = 30 dBm of the power budget for the whole network.
Unless stated otherwise, we choose the uncertainty in eavesdroppers' and neighboring users' channels, 0 = 0.005 and we choose the uncertainty in serving users' channels 1 = 10 −3 . It is justified to assume that BSs can achieve good channel estimates for their serving cell users compared to the neighboring cell users in a dense small cell network. Later in this section, we also investigate the effect of different values of channel uncertainties on the achievable secrecy rate. For energy efficiency maximization problem in Section IV, we choose power amplifier efficiency ξ = 0.2, is the power dissipation at each transmit antenna P A = 0.6W (27.78 dBm), and circuit power consumption P c = 2.5W (33.97 dBm) [35] , [46] .
We set the threshold secrecy rate r k,n = 0.1 bits/sec/Hz for M = 4 antennas at the BS and otherwise r k,n = 0.5 bits/sec/Hz for M ∈ {5, 6} antenna-BSs.
The convergence of Algorithm 1 for M = 5 antenna BS and minimum energy harvesting threshold e min = −20 dBm is shown by Fig. 2 . We can see that for some fixed channel, whether we assume perfect channel estimation 0 = 0, 1 = 0 or assume some channel uncertainty 0 = 0.005, 0 = 10 −3 , Algorithm 1 converges within 20 − 25 iterations. We also observe that if we assume the absence of eavesdropper, Algorithm 1 quickly converges in about 4 iterations. On average, Algorithm 1 requires 22.5 iterations before convergence, while the absence of eavesdroppers drops down the average required number of iterations to 3.5. The slower convergence in the presence of eavesdroppers is expected since then, not only the objective (42a) gets quite complicated, but also new constraints, (35) , (37) , and (38) are required to be satisfied.
The worst secrecy and normal rates (in the absence of eavesdroppers) for both perfect channel estimation dBm with fixed number of antennas at the BS M = 5. In Fig. 3 , we observe almost linear increase in the achievable rate with increase in the number of BS antennas. In Fig. 4 , we observe decrease in the achievable rate with the increase in the EH targets. This is because higher EH targets demands for more power from the BS to perform energy harvesting, which results in the decrease in the available power for information decoding, thus decreases the achievable information rate. Overall, Figs. 3 and 4 indicate the robustness of our proposed Algorithm 1. plots the worst secrecy rate versus number of antennas M for fixed energy harvesting threshold e min = −20 dBm. We can clearly observe a gain of around 0.5 bits/sec/Hz in the achieved secrecy rate of Algorithm 1 compared to that of the algorithm in [17] . Note that the proposed TS-based system not only enjoys the performance gain, but also promises implementation simplicity. The average number of iterations required for convergence are almost same for both Algorithm 1 and the algorithm in [17] . However, the proposed TS-based system model has a two-fold advantage; it not only enjoys the performance gain, but also promises implementation simplicity, as motivated in the Introduction in Section I.
Finally, the performance of our proposed SEE Algorithm 2 is evaluated. Fig. 8 shows the convergence of proposed Algorithm 2 for M = 5 antennas at the BS and energy harvesting threshold e min = −20
dBm. We can see that for some fixed channel, whether we assume perfect channel estimation 0 = 0, In Figs. 11 and 12 , we plot the numerator and denominator of the EE function, (46a), respectively, where numerator of EE corresponds to the sum-rate of the worst cell and denominator of EE corresponds to the total power, 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Considering simple and efficient transmit TS approach to ensure wireless energy harvesting and information decoding in a dense multi-cell network, we have proposed robust secrecy rate and secrecy energy efficiency maximization algorithms in the presence of multi-antenna eavesdroppers and channel estimation errors. Our robust optimization algorithm jointly designs for transmit energy and information beamformers at the BSs and the transmit TS ratio with the objective of maximizing the worst-case user secrecy rate under BS transmit power and UE minimum harvested energy constraints. The problem is very challenging due to nonconvex objective and numerous non-convex constraints. We have solved it by a new robust path-following algorithm, which involves one simple convex quadratic program in each iteration. We have also extended our algorithm to solve for worst cell secrecy EE maximization problem under secrecy rate quality-of-service constraints, which is further complex due to additional function of optimization variables in the denominator of secrecy rate function. Our numerical results confirm the merits of the proposed algorithms as their performance is quite close to that of the case where there are no eavesdroppers. Moreover, the proposed algorithm not only outperforms the existing algorithm that models PS based receiver but also the proposed transmit TS based model is implementation-wise quite simple than the PS-based model.
The first term in the left hand side of (A.5) is nonconvex, which is convexified by using the fact that √ xy is concave in x and y, i.e., √ xy ≤ Thus, using (A.6), (A.7), (A.8), and (A.9) in (A.5), we can get the approximation (37).
